![]() ![]() ![]() However, large gangs may be just as likely to be net importers of violence as net exporters (Papachristos 2009, pp. We might expect large gangs to use their size advantage to maintain a dominant community position by directing more violence at smaller rivals (Vargas 2016). Gang size variation and its impact on the directionality of violence offers limited clarification. Randle and Bichler ( 2017), by contrast, see many local dominance relationships in homicide networks in Southern California. ( 2013), for example, find little evidence of the specific network topological structures that would be indicative of a strict competitive hierarchy in homicides networks from Chicago and Boston, even though those gangs display large imbalances in the directionality of violence. 2018 Miller 1958 Papachristos 2009 Randle and Bichler 2017). However, the direct evidence for competitive dominance hierarchies within communities of gangs is mixed (see Bichler et al. Street gangs that are net importers of violence should therefore rank lower. 76), for example, starts with the observation that gang homicides are part of the process whereby individual gang members and gangs as social groups “jockey for positions of dominance.” If the attacking gang does indeed benefit more than the attacked in a violent exchange, then gangs that are net exporters of violence should rank higher in a gang community “pecking order” as more influence (e.g., status, reputation, supremacy) accrues to that gang. This paper seeks to understand how and why imbalances exist in intergroup street gang violence.Ī leading hypothesis is that imbalances in intergroup violence are tied to differences in competitive ranking between gangs. Rarely are they perfectly balanced as targets and aggressors over a collection of violent crimes. Gangs are either net exporters, or net importers of violence (Bichler et al. Directional competitive interactions between gangs are usually imbalanced. In either case, it is reasonable to describe intergroup gang violence as a directional competitive interaction that is meant to benefit one gang (the attacker) at the expense of its rival (the attacked). Violence directed at rivals may satisfy certain instrumental goals of both individual gang members and the gang as a whole, but it may also be central to the construction of individual and group identity (Bannister et al. Intergroup violence is common in communities with multiple criminal street gangs (Decker 1996 Glowacki et al. A model specifying the mechanism of competitive dominance is needed to correctly interpret gang size and violence patterns. Competitively superior gangs can be larger or smaller than competitively inferior gangs and a disproportionate source or target of directional violence, depending upon where exactly they fall in the competitive hierarchy. Gangs may mitigate competitive pressure by quickly finding gaps in the spatial coverage of superior competitors. Model expectations are explored with twenty-three years of data on gang homicides from Los Angeles. The model is extended to generate expectations about gang size distributions and the directionality of gang violence. Does competitive dominance lead to larger gangs, or allow them to remain small? Does competitive dominance lead gangs to mount more attacks against rivals, or expose them to more attacks? We explore a model developed in theoretical ecology to understand communities arranged in strict competitive hierarchies. However, it is not clear how competitive ability, gang size and reciprocal violence interact. Intergroup violence is assumed to play a key role in establishing and maintaining gang competitive dominance. ![]()
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